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 Hedge funds deliver alpha only in “good” times, irrespective of their fundamentals. 
 
 During “bad” times, hedge funds minimise their systematic risk. 
 
 Small, young, and lock-up funds, outperform their peers in terms of alpha. 
 














We analyse the drivers of hedge fund performance, focusing simultaneously on fund size, 
age, lockup period, fund strategies, business cycles and different market conditions, dealing 
with the omitted variable bias. We use exogenous break points and a switching Markov 
model to endogenously determine different market conditions. We find that HFs deliver 
positive alpha only during “good” times, irrespective of their fundamentals. During “bad” 
times, they minimise their systematic risk. Small and young funds, and those with 
redemption restrictions deliver higher alpha compared to their peers during “good” times. 
Finally, specific strategies deliver significantly negative alpha during “bad” times.  
Keywords: Hedge funds; Hedge funds characteristics; Hedge fund performance 













Hedge funds (HFs) are investment vehicles, which raise capital from institutional investors 
and wealthy individuals. In the fourth quarter of 2018, the assets under management (AUM) in 
HFs were almost US$3 trillion (Barclay Hedge, 2019).1 HF performance is measured with 
reference to a benchmark, and the difference in return between a portfolio and its benchmark is the 
active return of the portfolio. Performance attribution analyses this active return.  
There is a considerable number of studies in the literature that investigate the relationship 
between fund returns and fund-specific characteristics, such as size, age, lockup periods and fees 
(e.g. Frumkin and Vandegrift, 2009; Bae and Yi, 2012) and the relationship between fund returns 
and specific investment styles (e.g.; O’Doherty et al., 2016; Racicot and Theoret, 2016). There is 
also agreement in the literature that fund exposures change over time. Despite the importance of 
these studies the exact association between HF performance, HF strategies, HF characteristics and 
different market conditions has not yet been fully examined. In addition, there is an absence of a 
systematic examination of the commodity asset classes. Investors have not a clear understanding 
of how the above associations work together when forming their asset and portfolio allocation in 
their decision process.  
The previous limitations in the literature serve as the main motivation of this study, which 
seeks to offer an understanding of the drivers of hedge fund performance. Our study assists 
investors in having a better knowledge of the determinants of HF risk and performance, to know 
what to expect from HFs with different characteristics, considering business cycles and market 
conditions. Moreover, the investors can have a guide and construct a portfolio of selected funds 
according to their needs and fund managers’ fees. In this study, we also deal with the omitted 
variable bias of the preceding studies (see below in this section) referred to specific commodity 
factors. These commodity factors are related to energy, industrial metals, and agriculture/food 
index.  
Our main objective is to shed further light on the drivers of HF performance in terms of alpha 
and risk exposure, focusing on fund-specific characteristics, namely size, age and lockup period, 
fund strategies, business cycles and different market conditions. There are four hypotheses that are 
derived from the literature, as described in the next section. Business cycles are officially 











announced by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and the Economic Cycle 
Research Institute (ECRI) and have as an attribute a significant change in economic activity that 
lasts more than a few months. In the Summary Statistics section, we present, the specific time 
periods of these cycles. We follow a dual classification of business cycles as there is a focus on 
the two most important elements (growth and recessions) of business cycles. This exercise does 
not study business cycles or their different states, as this is beyond its scope. To our knowledge, 
the peak (trough) represents the highest (lowest) part of the expansion (recession) phase and, 
therefore, represents a very short period that cannot be sufficiently used for statistical analysis. A 
peak and a trough are usually identified after they have ended. 
We contribute to the literature in a number of different ways. Although there are studies (see 
Bollen and Whaley, 2009; and Patton and Ramadorai, 2013) that analyse HF performance, styles 
and state variations, and downside risk, we are the first — to the best of our knowledge — to study 
the relationship between fund performance, fund strategies and fund characteristics considering 
both multiple business cycles and different market conditions simultaneously. In addition, we 
make a distinction between business cycles and market conditions, as these events are not the 
same, having different implications for HF performance and resulting in sub-optimal investors’ 
decisions. We study North American HFs and identify three full business cycles since 1990. 
Furthermore, we do not isolate just one recession or one stressful event, since they have different 
implications for HF performance, as we describe later in our findings. Moreover, we characterise 
different economic states, classifying and ranking them from the most to the least desirable 
overlapping states (see empirical results section), showing that the relation between fund 
characteristics and fund performance is not static. The current study assists investors and fund of 
funds managers to better understand fund performance and have a guide in their investment 
decisions. They can consider the different exposures of different funds with different 
characteristics and can construct portfolios, which are balanced according to their needs. The 
controversial view that HFs produce positive alpha constantly is challenged, as investors may pay 
high fees that they should not normally pay. 
We propose a piecewise and parsimonious empirical specification with predefined and non-
defined structural breaks. This specification is flexible enough to capture HF behaviour within 
different regimes/periods, helping investors with their asset and portfolio allocations (see 










investments based on market conditions, fund characteristics, and their strategies, and avoiding 
paying high fees for poor or even negative alpha presented in our findings. We also use a 
systematic database merging and cleaning process. HFs that invest primarily in North America are 
examined, as North America accounts for 72% of the worldwide HF industry (Preqin Corporation 
2014), and we can identify three full BCs there since 1990. Funds that invest in equity or fixed-
income emerging markets that do not have direct exposure to North America is beyond the scope 
of this paper, although it could prove a future direction for study. Finally, since different 
commodities behave differently within the market (see Bhardwaj and Dunsby, 2014), we use 
several factors, namely agriculture/food, energy, industrial and precious metals, instead of a 
general commodity factor. 
We have a number of interesting findings. First HFs, on average, deliver significant alphas to 
investors only during “good” times, irrespective of their characteristics.2 Second, during “good” 
times, small and young funds – and those with redemption restrictions – outperform their peers. 
However, during “bad” times, small funds suffer more than large funds; young funds continue to 
outperform old ones; and funds that do not impose restrictions (and survive) outperform funds 
with lockups. It seems that fund managers who feel the pressure of not having the “safety” of 
redemption restrictions are more innovative and do better than their peers. Third, during stressful 
conditions, funds, on average, try to minimize their systematic risk, irrespective of the fundamental 
characteristics. Fourth, the Long Only strategy funds with no redemption restrictions, and the Multi 
Strategy for young funds, deliver significant negative alphas in ‘bad’ times. We provide a battery 
of robustness checks and our results are still valid (see empirical results section).3 
 
2 Related literature and hypotheses development 
HF literature is quite broad and studies the relationships between HF performance, HF 
fundamental characteristics and HF strategies, though not all simultaneously.  
                                                 
2 We define the excess returns during “good”(“bad”) times as the average excess returns during bull (bear) regimes 
and the excess returns during growth (recessions) periods.  
3 Many previous studies exclude data before 1994 because the majority of the databases for commercial use only came 
into existence from the early/mid 1990s, with a few exceptions such as the Eureka Hedge and Barclay Hedge DBs 
that also include pre-1994 dead funds. However, as an extra robustness test, we have excluded prior 1994 data and 










Although there are contradictory results due to different time periods, databases and 
methodologies, most studies conclude that the relationship between HF size and performance is 
negative (see  Schneeweis et al., 2002; Harri and Brorsen, 2004; Meredith, 2007; Joenväärä et al., 
2012). Commercial studies (e.g. Pertrac Corporation, 2012) also show that there is a negative 
relationship between size and performance. However, Gregoriou and Rouah (2002) find no 
evidence of a relationship, whereas Koh et al. (2003) study Asian HFs and find a positive 
relationship and economies of scale. Gregoriou and Rouah use the AUM at the inception date of 
each fund and not the average, as is most commonly used in the literature. 
The age of the HF is measured in months since it was launched, or since the date, it was 
entered in vendor databases. Howell (2001), Meredith (2007) and Frumkin and Vandegrift, (2009) 
find that young funds outperform old ones, and commercial studies (e.g. Pertrac Corporation, 
2012) reach the same conclusion. An exception is Schneeweis et al. (2002) who find a strong 
positive relationship between age and performance. However, Schneeweis et al. (2002), contrary 
to other studies, take into account funds, which started in the same month.  
Many studies (e.g. Ling, 1999, Ackerman et al., 1999; Budiono and Martens, 2010; Edwards 
and Caglayan, 2001; Joenväärä et al., 2012) find a positive relationship between performance fees 
and fund performance. Exceptions are Schneeweis et al. (2002) and Koh et al. (2003), who find no 
significant relationship, although the latter studies Asian HFs. It is natural to expect that higher 
performance fees correspond to managers with higher skills.  
Ling, (1999), Aragon, (2007) and Joenväärä et al. (2012) show that funds that impose 
redemption restrictions outperform funds that do not, as they are able to exploit liquidity premia 
for higher returns. Later studies (see Hong, 2014; and the references therein) show that although 
funds may have lower returns after decreasing share restrictions, investors reward fund managers 
by increasing flows. Getmansky at al. (2015) show the complexity of the relationship between 
fund flow and restrictions. More specifically, they show that the flow-performance relationship is 
convex for funds without share restrictions and concave for funds with share restrictions. Kaushik 
and Pennathur (2013) do not find a link between prior fund flows and fund returns, although they 











In this study, we challenge the above findings regarding size, age, and lockups. We believe 
that the above results do not always hold, as they are dynamic and change over time, according to 
different market conditions.4 So, our first hypothesis has as follows: 
Η1: At the fundamental level, small and young funds, and funds with redemption restrictions, 
deliver higher alpha with respect to their peers, during all market conditions.  
Liquidity has a prominent role in HFs and can affect even their survivability (Di Tommaso 
and Piluso, 2018). Schaub and Schmid (2013) find that in the pre-crisis period, more illiquid funds 
produce a share illiquidity premium; and in the crisis period, an illiquidity discount. While share 
restrictions allow funds to manage illiquid assets effectively in the pre-crisis period, they are 
insufficient to ensure effective management of illiquid portfolios during the crisis. Siegmann and 
Stefanova (2017) find that equity-focused HFs show a significant shift from negative to positive 
relation between market beta and liquidity after the major market microstructure changes in 2000.  
Teo (2011) finds that the return impact of fund flows is stronger when funds embrace liquidity 
risk, when market liquidity is low and when funding liquidity is tight. Hwang, et al. (2017) argue 
that systemic risk is positively related to cross-sectional variations in HF returns. 
Finally, a prominent issue in the HF literature is the stylised fact that HFs have dynamic 
correlations with markets (Stoforos et al., 2017), fund exposures change over time and different 
strategies demonstrate different exposures in a non-linear framework (see Bollen and Whaley, 
2009; Billio et al., 2012; Meligkotsidou and Vrontos, 2014; O’Doherty et al., 2016). We proceed 
one step further and test the hypothesis of the alpha delivered to investors and the changing 
exposures in relation to fundamental characteristics and market conditions. Therefore, our 
hypothesis for alpha has as follows: 
Η2: HFs deliver positive alpha irrespective of their fundamental characteristics during all 
market conditions. 
The above hypothesis examines whether HFs always deliver positive alpha to investors 
considering their fundamentals as well. Our hypothesis for market exposures has as follows:  
Η3: During stressful conditions, funds decrease their market exposures irrespective of the 
fundamental characteristics. 
                                                 
4 When dealing with this and the other hypotheses, in our proposed empirical specification we also, use several 











We challenge also the conventional wisdom that HFs always deliver a positive alpha, which 
implies that investors should always pay high fees. This is because we observe that HF 
performance is dependent not only on HF characteristics, but also on HF strategies and different 
market conditions. There might be cases (e.g. Long Only and Global Macro) where HFs could 
deliver negative alpha to investors. Similar to our previous hypothesis, we test the following: 
 H4: Within specific market conditions, HFs with specific fundamental characteristics and 
following specific strategies deliver negative alpha to investors. 
The above hypothesis moves further from H2 by examining also the possibility that HFs — 
considering also their fundamentals and their strategies — deliver negative alpha. In other words, 
we not only challenge the conventional wisdom that HFs deliver a positive alpha, but also consider 
the possibility of a negative alpha under certain conditions.  
3 Methodology and data 
3.1 Empirical Specification 
Following Fung and Hsieh (1997) and Agarwal and Naik (2004), we examine HFs to capture 
their dynamic strategies. We suggest that it is not wise to use the same model as Fung and Hsieh 
when we explain HF strategies because of the complex nature of the HF industry and because 
different HF groups have different characteristics. To capture the non-linear risk exposures in HF 
strategies we propose a parsimonious empirical specification with predefined and non-defined 
structural breaks.  
The proposed empirical specification refers to business cycles and different market conditions. 
This model is flexible as it uses the stepwise regression technique (see Dor et al., 2006; and Jawadi 
and Khanniche, 2012) within each regime/cycle, considering fundamental fund characteristics 
alone and fundamental fund characteristics and strategies simultaneously.5  
The first specification contains predefined structural breaks conditional on the growth and 
recession periods. These are defined based on the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). 
                                                 
5 Under the stepwise regression technique, the variables are added or removed from the model based on the 
significance of the F-value at 5% level of significance. First, the single best value is chosen and then is paired with 
the other independent variables, one at a time. Next, a second variable is chosen and so on, until no further variables 
are included or excluded from the estimation process. Stepwise regression allows to examine the importance of a large 











A recession is denoted as a significant decline in economic activity that spreads through the 
economy, lasting from few months to many years that has a visible effect on production, 
employment, real income, and other major economic indicators. 6 
𝑟𝑗,𝑆 = 𝛼𝑗,𝑆 + 𝛽𝑗,1𝐹1,𝑆 + 𝛽𝑗,2𝐹2,𝑆 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑗,𝑘𝐹𝑘,𝑆 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑆     (1) 
where 𝑟𝑗,𝑆 and 𝛼𝑗,𝑆 are the return and a constant for HF 𝑗 in state 𝑆 respectively, 𝐹𝑘,𝑆 is a systematic 
factor, 𝑘 = 1, … , 𝐾, 𝛽𝑗,𝑘 is the sensitivity of the 𝑗 HF to factor 𝑘. 𝑆 = {𝐺1, 𝐺2 … 𝐺𝑀, 𝑅1, 𝑅2 … 𝑅𝐿} is 
a state variable that takes the values of the vector 𝐺𝑚, 𝑚 = 1, … , 𝑀, when we are in one of the 𝑀 
growth periods and the values of the vector 𝑅𝑙, 𝑙 = 1, … , 𝐿, when we are in one of the 𝐿 recessions, 
where the vectors 𝐺𝑚 = [𝐺𝑚,1, 𝐺𝑚,2 … 𝐺𝑚,𝑛] and 𝑅𝑙 = [𝑅𝑙,1, 𝑅𝑙,2 … 𝑅𝑙,𝐻]. In other words, the first 
specification contains pre-defined structural breaks dependent on the state of the U.S. economy.  
The second specification contains non-defined structural breaks conditional on the different 
states of the market index (bull and bear regimes). We relate HF returns to the market factor since 
our objective is to capture the different conditions in the market. We apply a regime-switching 
Markov model (Hamilton, 1989) like other studies which endogenously determine or measure the 
structural breaks of HF returns and volatility (see Akay, et al., 2013; and Teulon, et al., 2014; 
Meligkotsidou and Vrontos, 2014). However, in this study we measure the exposures of HF 
returns, considering the states of the market index, the Wilshire 5000 TRI, including dividends 
and, more specifically, the bull and bear regimes as described below in this section. This index is 
a better proxy for the entire market compared to the S&P500 index as it captures almost all firms 
actively traded in the US. 
As with the first specification, within each regime of the market index a stepwise regression 
technique is applied to limit the final list of factors for each HF group (following Jawadi and 
Khanniche, 2012) and we do not rely on a single model simply adding factors on existing models. 
We use specific criteria to select the loading factors (see methodology and data section). 
Under the Markov switching model, systematic and unsystematic events may affect the 
dependent variable because of the presence of discontinuous shifts in the average market return 
and volatility. The change in regime is regarded as a random and unpredictable event. The model 
is as follows: 
                                                 











𝑟𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝑡 𝐼𝑡 + 𝜔𝑢𝑡       (2) 
𝐼𝑡 = 𝜇𝑆𝑡 + 𝜎𝑆𝑡𝜀𝑡                    (3) 
where 𝑟𝑗,𝑡 is the return for HF 𝑗 in period 𝑡, 𝑆𝑡 is a Markov chain with n states and transition 
probability matrix P and 𝑢𝑡 and 𝜀𝑡 are independent and normally distributed random variables with 
zero mean and unit variance. 
Each state of the market index I has its own mean and volatility. HF returns are related to the 
states of the market index. They are defined by a parameter α plus a factor loading β, on the 
conditional mean of the factor. In addition, HF volatilities are related to the states of the market 
index I. They are defined by the factor loading β on the conditional volatility of the factor plus the 
volatility of the idiosyncratic risk factor u. In both cases, β could be different, conditional on the 
state of the risk factor I.  
For n = 2 states, n takes the value one when we are in the bull regime and zero when we are 
in the bear regime. 
𝑟𝑡 = {
𝛼 +  𝛽0𝐼𝑡 + 𝜔𝑢𝑡 ,            𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑆𝑡 = 0
𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐼𝑡 + 𝜔𝑢𝑡  ,            𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑆𝑡 = 1
                (4) 
where the state variable S depends on time t, and β depends on the state variable S as: 
𝛽𝑆𝑡 = {
𝛽0 ,            𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑆𝑡 = 0
𝛽1 ,            𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑆𝑡 = 1
                 (5) 




]       
where 𝑝𝑖𝑗 the transition probability from regime i to regime j with 𝑝00 = 1 − 𝑝01 and 𝑝11 = 1 − 
𝑝10; where 𝑝00 and 𝑝11 stand for the probability of being in the bear regime, given that the system 
was in the bear regime during the previous period, and the probability of being in the bull regime, 
given that the system was in the bull regime during the previous period, respectively. The method 
used by investors to forecast different market conditions, although an interesting research question, 











We form portfolios for all HFs according to their size, age and lockup redemption restrictions 
to examine HFs at a fundamental level. Moreover, we form sub-portfolios for each of the 11 HF 
strategies to examine HFs at a mixed level (see below in this section). Although it is beyond the 
scope of this paper, other candidate drivers of HF performance and risk could be, for example, 
management and performance fees, use of leverage and use of the high-water mark.  
3.2 Data 
We build a sample of monthly data from EurekaHedge and the BarclayHedge databases from 
January 1990 (similar to Denvir and Hutson, 2006; Harris and Mazibas, 2010; and Giannikis and 
Vrontos, 2011) to March 2014. The area under study is North America, where we can identify 
three full business cycles since 1990. Most of the databases came into existence from the early/mid 
1990s, with a few exceptions, such as the EurekaHedge and BarclayHedge databases, which came 
earlier. The used sample contains both live and dead funds before 1994; hence, it does not suffer 
from survivorship bias. In the robustness tests we exclude the period before 1994; we also use only 
the period before 1994 to test the validity of our results. 
We use specific algorithms for the database merging and cleaning processes and specific 
select statements for funds that invest primarily in North America were used.7 The survivorship 
and instant history bias are minimized by including dead/ceased reporting funds and by eliminating 
the first 12 months of each HF. For more details about HF bias, see Fung and Hsieh (2004). 
Following the literature (see Ramadorai, 2012) we “winsorise” the outliers at the top and bottom 
by 0.50%. 
Multiple share classes of funds are treated as separate funds (see Ramadorai, 2013) to make 
the selection bias correction robust against the variations in liquidity restrictions, returns and fee 
structures that describe different share classes of the same fund. So, after merging 29,326 funds of 
all types, we end up with a dataset containing 6,373 funds with returns net of fees. We map the 
fundamental characteristics data with the relevant funds to construct portfolios, as described 
below.  
                                                 
7 Regarding the merger and cleaning process, we consider (i) administration data (for instance, HF name/legal 
structure, management company/legal structure, manager name, inception date), and (ii) quantitative data (for instance 
return correlations). We eliminate records that contain null, N/A, and consecutive zero returns. We focus on HFs that 











 We use the strategies that fund managers report in the underlying databases and proceed to a 
mapping between these database strategies in a way similar to other authors (see Joenväärä et al., 
2012). The dataset contains 11 HF strategies: Short Bias (SB), Long Only (LO), Sector (SE), Long 
Short (LS), Event Driven (ED), Multi Strategy (MS), Global Macro (GM), Relative Value (RV), 
Market Neutral (MN), strategies of Commodity Trading Advisor (CTA) funds, and Others (OT).8 
We classify these 11 strategies as directional (absolute values of the correlation coefficient above 
0.5), semi-directional (absolute values of the correlation coefficient between 0.22 and 0.49) and 
non-directional (absolute values of the correlation coefficient between 0 and 0.21) strategies, 
according to their correlation with the market index Wilshire 5000TRI, including dividends. 
Hence, the SB, LO, LS, and SE are directional strategies; the ED, MS, OT, and GM are semi-
directional strategies; and the RV, MN, and CTA non-directional strategies. 
Table 1 presents the 14 used loading factors using Datastream and the Fama and French online 
library, according to specific criteria, such as their availability, the collinearity between them and 
the correlation with strategies, and what factors have been used previously in the literature based 
on their significance. The underlying risk factors have an impact on hedge fund performance as 
the hypothetical abnormal returns of HFs can be explained partially to the exposures of HFs to 
these factors. In other words, HF managers exploit, to a large extent, risk premia when claiming 
that they provide abnormal returns to investors. This implies that investors pay high incentive fees 
that do not reflect fund managers’ skills. We have classified these factors to broader categories 
such as equity factors (used by Dor et al., 2006; Billio et al., 2012; Patton and Ramadorai, 2013); 
credit factors (used by Billio et al., 2012; Ibbotson et al., 2011; Giannikis and Vrontos, 2011; and 
Bali et al., 2011); and commodity factors (used by Capocci and Hubner, 2004). However, others, 
such as Giannikis and Vrontos, 2011; and Jawadi and Khanniche, 2012 use a total commodity 
index; others, such as Billio et al., 2012 use gold-only indices); real estate factor; currency factor 
(used by Capocci, 2009); and option factor (used by Billio et al., 2012). The VIX index is currently 
investable through various exchange-traded fund (ETF) products. We do not consider lookback 
straddles that are more appropriate to the CTA strategies (Fung and Hsieh, 2001) due to data 
availability for the early part of the period (the early 1990s) under examination.   
                                                 
8 CTAs use systematic trading or make extensive use of derivatives and commodity trading. The Others strategy uses 
different styles / tools (e.g. private investment in public equity, close-ended) or even allocations (e.g. start-ups) not 











[Insert Table 1] 
 
3.2.1 Fundamental characteristics and strategies  
The objective is to examine the difference between small versus large funds, young versus old 
funds, and funds with lockup periods versus funds without lockup periods regarding their 
performance (alpha and exposures). Our analysis considers all the HF strategies except for CTAs, 
examined separately due to its uniqueness as a strategy.  
We follow a large/small and a young/old classification according to the literature (see Harri 
and Brorsen, 2004; Meredith, 2007; Frumkin and Vandegrift, 2009; Joenväärä et al., 2012). The 
industry has grown over time; however, this does not mean that small funds will be in the early 
years only as the number of HFs has increased significantly in recent years.9 
The median AUM of all HFs, is US$34.4m; and form and track two portfolios of funds during 
the period under study: those that were below US$34.4m, classifying them as small, and those 
above US$34.4m, classifying them as large. We compute the median age in months since the 
inception of each fund, which is 62 months. We form two portfolios of funds: those aged less than 
62 months, classifying them as young, and those aged more than 62 months, classifying them as 
old.  
For lockup periods we form two portfolios: those with funds with lockup restrictions, and 
those without restrictions, following the literature (see Aragon, 2007; Joenväärä et al., 2012, 
Schaub and Schmid, 2013; Hong, 2014). Within the data sample, about half of the funds do not 
have an explicit lockup period. There are other implicit restrictions, such as the redemption 
frequency or the redemption notice period, which can be considered as “soft” restrictions. 
However, too many records were missing to enable further analysis.  
We form six sub-portfolios for each of the 11 strategies (fundamental level), a total of 66 
portfolios at mixed level: the size portfolios (small and large funds), the age portfolios (young and 
old funds), and lockup portfolios (funds with and without lockup periods). 
 
                                                 










4 Empirical results 
In this section we present the basic statistics at strategy/fundamental level, and the market 
classification into broad categories of HF strategies. We also give details of the regime switches 
and we report the results from the multi-factor models regarding alphas and exposures. 
4.1 Summary Statistics  
We provide basic statistics on raw returns for each of the 11 strategies and then statistics for 
each of the six portfolios regarding all the HFs. Table 2 panel A presents the summary statistics of 
the raw (net of fees) returns for the 11 HF strategies, where each strategy is a time series of 
averages with respect to its relevant HFs. We use equal weights in the averaging procedure to 
avoid biases against large funds. At the top left are the most directional strategies and at the bottom 
right are the most non-directional strategies. 
On average, directional strategies — with the exception of the CTA strategy — have more 
volatile returns than all non-directional strategies since they are more aggressive. More 
specifically, some strategies (e.g. Sector, Long Short) deliver high monthly mean returns (at least 
1.10%), being more aggressive than non-directional strategies (e.g. Market Neutral). There are 
also strategies (e.g. Short Bias) that deliver low monthly mean returns (0.10%). The Short Bias 
strategy has a high negative correlation to the market index of -0.924, whereas strategies like 
Market Neutral and CTA have low correlation to the market index.  
Table 2 panel B presents the statistics for all HFs based on the fundamental characteristics. 
Each fundamental group is a time series of averages with respect to its relevant HFs. In absolute 
returns, large funds, old funds and funds with lockups outperform their peers. 
 [Insert Table 2] 
We consider different business cycles and market conditions. During the period January 1990 
- March 2014, there are three official business cycles as denoted by NBER; hence, there are four 
growth periods (01/1990–07/1990, 04/1991–03/2001, 12/2001–12/2007 and 07/2009–03/2014) 
and three recession periods (08/1990–03/1991, 04/2001–11/2001 and 01/2008–06/2009).  
A Markov switching process determines the different market conditions (bull and bear 
regimes) based on the mean and volatility of the Wilshire 5000TRI. The value of a Markov 










are often based on the past state plus some random probability of switching state. Thus, the regime 
can be dependent on predetermined data rather than, having an ex post classification of the state 
variable. We perform a unit root test with breaks and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistic 
results in value -16.4; we reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, as the p-value is less than 1%. 
The return coefficients for the bull and bear regimes are 1.58 and -8.65 respectively, which are 
significant; the transition probability from a bear to a bull regime is 61.90%, while the transition 
probability from a bull to a bear regime is as low as 5.32%.  
We also examine the transition probabilities. At time t, when we are in the down regime, the 
probability at time t+1 of staying in the same regime is 0.40%. When we are in the up regime the 
transition probability to the down regime is 7.50%. We further test for inverse roots of 
autoregressive polynomials and no root lies outside the unit circle. 
There are two selected categories of regimes to enable us to compare with the business cycles. 
Hence, the period under examination is divided into four bull regimes (01/1990–06/1990, 
11/1990–10/2000, 10/2002–05/2008 and 03/2009–03/2014) and three bear regimes (07/1990–
10/1990, 11/2000–09/2002 and 06/2008–02/2009). We later classify the market conditions from 
the most favourable to the least favourable overlapping state as: bull regimes, growth periods, 
recession periods and bear regimes. 
4.2 Alpha Analysis  
In the next paragraphs we conduct an alpha analysis for different market conditions and states 
of economic activity. We also, consider fundamental characteristics and group strategies.  
4.2.1 Different market conditions  
Table 3 panel A shows the alpha results for the growth and recession periods. We measure 
alpha as the monthly excess return, expressed in percentages. Within growth periods, when 
grouped according to each of the fundamental characteristics, all HFs deliver alphas, significantly 
different from zero. The highest alpha is 1.322 and the lowest is 0.823, delivered from funds that 
impose redemption restrictions and funds that do not impose redemption restrictions respectively. 











have protection against redemptions. Within recession periods, on average, HFs do not provide 
significant alphas to investors, irrespective of their characteristics.  
Table 3 panel B presents the alpha results for the bull and bear regimes. During bull regimes 
all HFs deliver significantly strong alphas or excess returns. Again, the highest alpha of 0.507 is 
delivered from funds that impose redemption restrictions, since they are able to exploit liquidity 
premia and also have protection against redemptions. The lowest alpha of 0.301 is delivered from 
young funds, since they are not well established. During bear, regimes HFs, irrespective of their 
fundamental characteristics, do not provide significant alphas to investors. Table 3 offers also the 
statistical tests for the difference between alphas across different groups of HFs (see Paternoster 
et al., 1998). There are statistically significant differences in alphas.  Panel C presents information 
regarding the adjusted R-square and F-statistics.  
 [Insert Table 3] 
4.2.2 Different states of economic activity  
Table 4 reports the average performance of the different groups within “good” and “bad” 
times. Small funds outperform large funds during “good” times. However, during “bad” times the 
results are insignificant for every fund characteristic. Young funds outperform old funds during all 
conditions, especially during “good” times, since they can exploit the timing advantage. We 
mention that the impact of age on performance is dependent on bull/bear or good/bad market 
conditions.  
As expected, funds with lockup periods outperform funds without lockup periods during the 
“good” times due to the illiquidity premia exploitation. However, during “bad” times, funds 
without lockup periods slightly outperform funds with lockup periods. It seems that funds with 
lockup periods cannot successfully exploit the illiquidity premia during “bad” times, for instance 
by investing in real estate. This is in contrast to funds without lockup periods that try to be more 
efficient, for instance investing in counter-cyclical industries.  
We further study the behaviour of alpha in each of the four different states of economic 
activity. We classify and rank four different states of economic activity, from the most desirable 
to the least desirable state. Based on the Markov switching model, the worst or most severe state 
is the bear regime, because it captures market downturns accompanied with great volatility. The 
next less severe state is the recession, as during this period there are mostly negative market returns 











mostly positive market returns. Finally, the most favourable state is the bull regime, due to very 
high market returns.  
Table 4 also shows that in the most favourable state, HFs do not provide the highest excess 
returns to investors, as HFs are actually exploiting the upward market conditions by increasing 
their exposures to the market factor. This means that HFs do not always deserve the excess fees 
that they receive from investors. Large compared to small funds perform very well during 
extremely good conditions, such as the bull regimes (0.476). The opposite happens with small 
funds with 0.313 in the extremely good states. It appears that in extremely good conditions, large 
funds are better known. So, the larger a HF is, the better known it is, and the more information 
external investors have about it, increasing their will to invest in it. However, in extremely negative 
conditions, large funds do not have the flexibility to adapt. Moreover, the impact of size on 
performance is conditional on bull/bear or good/bad market conditions.  
Old funds perform better than young funds, meaning that in extremely good market conditions 
reputation is more important than the timing advantage. Especially for those funds that have a good 
proven track record and remain in the market for a relatively long time. Funds with lockup periods 
outperform funds without lockup periods during “good” times, 0.507 and 1.322 for the best (bull 
regime) and good (growth) states respectively, as these funds are exploiting illiquidity premia. 
However, we cannot study the significance of the differences in alphas in each pair (small/large, 
young/old, and funds with and without lockup periods) due to the small number of observations, 
i.e. eight observations (states) for each pair. 
One reasonable explanation for why the large and old HFs outperform their peers is that large 
funds and old funds enjoy the benefits of their size and their long establishment (reputation), 
respectively. Although the formal test of how HF reputation can be linked to the alpha is an 
interesting future direction, it is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we find that this does 
not work when conditions are just good (growth), when there might be fluctuations in market 
returns and investing opportunities are less frequent.  










4.2.3 Fundamental characteristics and group strategies 
In this section we provide an alpha analysis, taking into account the strategy groups and the 
fundamental factors. As previously mentioned, there are three broad groups of strategies: 
directional, semi-directional and non-directional and Table 5 present their results.10  
Large directional funds outperform small directional funds in both “good” and “bad” 
conditions as they can benefit from the upward market movement and avoid the downward market 
movement by exploiting their size, since external investors have better information on that HF. 
The same applies to all young directional funds, except those, which follow the Short Bias strategy, 
as they may not have a reputation, but are nevertheless able to exploit the timing advantage as 
opposed to old directional funds. All funds that follow directional strategies with lockup 
restrictions outperform the directional strategies without lockup restrictions, except those, which 
follow the Short Bias strategy. The reasons are the illiquidity premia exploitation in “good” market 
conditions and the lockup protection during “bad” times; directional strategies are more exposed 
during “bad” times. 
The semi-directional large funds outperform small funds during “good” market conditions 
(due to better exploitation of the upward market movement), whereas during “bad” market 
conditions small semi-directional strategies outperform large funds due to their flexibility. All old 
semi-directional strategies outperform young semi-directional funds in all market conditions due 
to their experience and market establishment. Moreover, semi-directional strategies with lockup 
restrictions outperform those without lockup restrictions in “good” market conditions (due to the 
illiquidity premia), whereas the opposite is true during “bad” market conditions. One explanation 
is that funds with no redemption restrictions (that survive) during “bad” times should be more 
innovative and efficient than their peers as fund managers feel high pressure.  
The small non-directional funds outperform large funds during “good” times as small funds 
use some market exposure to benefit from the upward market movement, and this also explains 
why during “bad” times small funds underperform the large funds. Old non-directional funds 
outperform young funds because of their market establishment, whereas young funds outperform 
during “bad” times due to the timing advantage. All non-directional funds with lockup restrictions 
                                                 
10 There is a gradual classification from extreme directional strategies (e.g. Short Bias strategy) to the extreme non-










outperform funds without lockup restrictions in all market conditions as fund managers exploit 
illiquidity premia during “good” times and the protection of the redemption restrictions during 
“bad” times. 
[Insert Table 5] 
Table 6 presents the results for the best (worst) two strategy funds with specific fundamental 
characteristics during “good” and “bad” times. Investors should be aware of these strategies - not 
only to have high abnormal returns but also to avoid strategies that are harmful when considering 
them into their asset and portfolio allocation decisions. Thus, they can avoid paying high fees for 
poor or even negative alphas. In other words, to avoid losing money. During “good” times, the top 
performers are Sector young and Long Short young funds in terms of excess returns, with 
significant results of 4.18% and 2.86%, respectively, on a monthly basis. One explanation is that 
both strategies are directional, and another is that both funds are young, which in general provide 
superior returns to old funds. Sector funds have a deeper knowledge of specific cyclical sectors. It 
is conceptually easy to understand but difficult to implement a Long Short strategy; hence, fund 
managers with superior stock-picking abilities can benefit from such a strategy.  
During “bad” times, the top performers are small and old funds that follow the Others strategy 
and deliver high and statistically significant excess returns of 4.14% and 2.64% respectively; this 
strategy invests mainly in start-ups with high yields. During “bad” times, the bottom performers 
are funds without redemption restrictions that follow the Long Only strategy and young funds that 
follow the Multi Strategy and deliver significantly negative alphas. This poor performance can be 
explained by the fact that Long Only funds without restrictions do not have investing alternatives 
and they are not protected from redemptions. Young funds that follow the Multi Strategy seem to 
lack the necessary experience of implementing this type of complex strategy, which is a 
combination of other strategies. 
From the previous discussion, we reject H1 that at the fundamental level, small and young 
funds, and funds with redemption restrictions, deliver higher alpha with respect to their peers. This 
is because that relationship is questionable when we consider ‘bad’ times. In other words, H1 is 
true only during ‘good’ market conditions. We also reject H2 that HFs are able to deliver positive 
alpha to investors at all times, irrespective of their fundamental characteristics. It seems that HFs 











strategies with specific fundamental characteristics within specific market conditions deliver 
negative alpha to investors. We found that the Long Only strategy funds with no redemption 
restrictions and the Multi Strategy for young funds deliver significant negative alphas in “bad” 
times. The negative alpha is a result similar to that of Teo (2011), although he concentrates on 
funds with the lowest exposures to liquidity risk. We focus jointly on specific fund strategies and 
characteristics. 
 [Insert Table 6] 
4.3 Exposure Analysis 
In the next paragraphs we present an exposure analysis for different market conditions and 
states of economic activity. We also, consider fundamental characteristics and group strategies.  
4.3.1 Different market conditions  
Table 7 panel A shows that, during growth periods, the most common exposures are MAI, 
SMB, and then MOM and DEF in absolute terms (portfolio allocations). MAI has the highest 
exposure for all fund groups when compared with the other exposures. The exposure to MAI 
ranges from 0.355 for funds with lockups to 0.394 for old funds. The exposure to SMB ranges 
from 0.127 for small funds to 0.173 for funds with lockups and these exposures are statistically 
significant at 1% the level. Young funds have the highest exposure to the MOM factor (0.103) 
which is almost twice the MOM exposure for old funds. For the other groups, there are no large 
differences in exposure to the MOM factor. Moreover, all groups present negative exposure to 
DEF that ranges from -1.406 for young funds to -0.491 for large funds and these exposures are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. In total, there are 37 exposures to the various asset classes. 
Overall, within the growth period, HFs have relatively high asset allocation exposures for higher 
returns, irrespective of their fundamental characteristics. 
Table 7 panel B shows that exposures for recessions are fewer compared to the growth periods 
in terms of asset and portfolio allocation. The most common exposures are MAI and COAG. The 
exposure to MAI is the most important for all fund groups although, overall, is lower compared to 
growth periods as fund managers try to minimize their risk. Large funds, old funds, and funds with 











0.084, respectively which are higher compared to their peers. In total, there are 20 exposures to 
asset classes compared to 37 during growth periods. This means that fund managers try to minimise 
their exposures at the expense of lower alphas during recessions. Panel C gives information 
regarding the adjusted R-squared and F-statistics.  
 [Insert Table 7] 
Table 8 panel A shows that during bull regimes, the most important exposures are MAI and 
MOM. Compared to the other exposures, the exposure to MAI is the most important. The highest 
is 0.410 for small funds and the lowest is 0.367 for funds with no lockups and are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. MOM exposures range from 0.052 to 0.070 and are statistically 
significant at the 1% level, for all the groups. Similarly to the growth periods there is, as expected, 
no wide distribution of exposures in HFs in terms of asset allocations. In total, there are 32 asset 
class exposures across all strategies. In general, fund managers during “good” times try to exploit 
the upward market movement and increase their exposures. 
Table 8 panel B shows that during bear regimes there are fewer exposures compared to growth 
periods in terms of asset allocation and portfolio allocation. MAI, SMB and then COIM are the 
most common exposures. The MAI exposure is the most important compared to the other 
exposures. In bull regimes, fund managers try to reduce their MAI exposure to minimize their risk. 
The exposures for small funds (0.237), young funds (0.223), and funds with lockups (0.196) are 
higher than their peers. The exposures to SMB for the large funds (0.193), old funds (0.159), and 
fund with redemption restrictions (0.206) are higher than their peers and are statistically 
significant. The exposures to the COIM factor range from 0.113 (young funds) to 0.086 (funds 
with lockups) and are statistically significant. The total number of exposures during the bear 
regimes is 26 across all HF strategies. During bear regimes, fund managers try to minimise their 
exposures in a similar way to recessions. Panel C shows information regarding the adjusted R-
squared and F-statistics.  
 [Insert Table 8] 
In the following paragraphs we give a brief outline of the most important findings for each of 











During “good” market conditions, the most important exposures for both small and large 
funds are the market, Small minus Big and Momentum. Both groups try to exploit the upward 
market movement, providing significant alpha to investors. They also have a statistically 
significant negative default premium exposure, as the DEF premium is negative during “good” 
times. On average, small funds appear to have larger exposures to these factors, and deliver higher 
statistically significant alpha than large funds, as we discuss below.  
During stressful market conditions (recessions or bear regimes), both small and large funds 
decrease their exposures and do not deliver significant alpha to investors. Market exposure is still 
the most important for both groups, although exposures to energy and agriculture commodities are 
also statistically significant as fund managers switch to these during stressful market conditions. 
Large funds seem to be more successful than small funds in minimising their risk as they have a 
small number of exposures.  
Overall, small funds are more successful in terms of alpha than large funds (although 
according to our H1, there is not enough evidence to further support this during stressful market 
conditions). This can be explained by assuming that the most talented fund managers build 
experience in large funds and then self-select to start their own firms. Another explanation is the 
stellar small-fund performance. Small funds have better niche opportunities than large funds 
because as a fund increases in size, fund managers have to adopt less profitable opportunities to 
accommodate their large investments – the well documented effect of diseconomies of scale in HF 
literature (see, for example, Joenväärä et al., 2012). Moreover, in small funds there is higher 
pressure due to lower AUM and, therefore, lower associated management fees. Another 
explanation is that the larger the fund, the further away the fund managers are from security-level 
analysis.  
During “good” times, both young and old funds exploit upward market movement by 
increasing their exposures, with young funds being more successful because of the timing 
advantage, as we have already discussed (see earlier in this section). The most important 
statistically significant exposures are the market, Momentum, and the Small minus Big factor. 
During “bad” times, neither group provides significant alpha to investors; instead managers try to 
minimise their risk. The most important exposures are the market, and the energy and agriculture 











Moreover, both groups have statistically significant negative High minus Low exposure 
during “bad” times. However, young funds appear to have higher exposure to this factor. It is 
worth mentioning that young funds, by definition, have a timing advantage over old funds. This is 
because young funds tend to be formed at times that are advantageous for specific strategies. An 
example is funds that specialise in securitised credit strategy after a recession in response to 
opportunities in this area. In addition, young funds appear to be more return driven because they 
are not yet established. 
During “good” times, funds with and without redemption restrictions deliver significant alpha 
to investors, although funds that impose lockup restrictions are more successful because they can 
exploit liquidity premia. The most important statistically significant factors for both groups are the 
market, Small minus Big, Momentum, and the default spread (negative). Overall, funds that 
impose redemption restrictions are riskier, having higher exposure in terms of asset allocations 
than funds that do not impose restrictions. During “bad” times, both groups reduce their exposure, 
although funds with no lockups appear to have slightly lower exposure. In general, it seems that 
funds that impose lockup restrictions are more successful as they are protected from withdrawal 
risk, and can, therefore, have higher exposure than their peers and also exploit more illiquidity 
premia (e.g. new premia or exploit better the existing premia). However, during stressful 
conditions, funds with no restrictions (that survive) are more successful than funds with 
restrictions. 
Table 9 provides the different exposures for all HFs, taking into account only the fundamental 
characteristics and different economic states. We focus on MAI and then on SMB, HML, and 
MOM which are four of the most common exposures. As it was expected, all groups, on average, 
decrease their MAI exposures during stressful market conditions. There is a large decrease in 
exposures across all groups during bear regimes. However, during recessions, large and old funds, 
and funds without lockup periods, do not significantly change their exposures, meaning that 
recessions are less fierce than bear regimes for HFs. All groups decrease their MOM exposures 
during stressful market conditions. This is not surprizing because MOM is a vital factor during 
“good” times when fund managers keep up their investments’ momentum. Regarding HML, 
during ‘bad’ times, most groups not only reduce their exposures but even reverse some exposures 
from positive to negative. All groups reduce their exposures to SMB, from growth to recession 











We also examine the MAI behaviour of the underlying groups within different states. We 
classify and rank four different states of economic activity, from the most desirable to the least 
desirable state (see earlier in this section). The groups have the highest market exposures during 
the best state, and in almost all cases, these exposures gradually diminish when moving closer to 
the worst state. Small funds have higher exposures in extreme good and bad financial conditions 
compared to large funds. Young funds have higher exposures in extremely good and bad 
conditions compared to old funds. Funds with lockup periods provide higher exposures during 
“good” times, whereas in the bad and worst states this group provides higher and lower exposures, 
respectively, compared to funds without redemption restrictions. However, we cannot study the 
significance of the differences in alphas in each pair (small/large, young/old and funds, with and 
without lockup periods) due to the small number of observations, i.e. eight observations (states) 
for each pair. For MOM, SMB, and HML, due to many insignificant figures, we cannot draw sound 
conclusions about their behaviour within different states of the economic activity. However, within 
best states (bull regimes) the underlying exposures seem in general higher compared to the good 
states (growth periods). Table 9 also offers the statistical tests for the difference between market, 
size, high minus low, and momentum exposures across different groups of HFs (see Paternoster et 
al., 1998). There are statistically significant differences especially in market exposures. 
[Insert Table 9] 
 
4.3.2 Fundamental characteristics, group strategies  
We follow a market analysis taking into account the strategy groups and the fundamental 
characteristics to offer a broader perspective. Table 10 panel A presents the results for the 
directional strategies and the fundamental characteristics. All funds, regardless of their 
characteristics, lower their exposures during recessions as compared to growth periods since they 
try to protect themselves against negative market movements. Large and old funds, and funds 
without lockup restrictions, decrease their exposures during bear regimes. Young funds have the 
timing advantage (they enter the market when it is in their interest) and funds with lockup 
restrictions are protected from the withdrawal risk.  
Table 10 panel B shows the results for the semi-directional strategies and the fundamental 
characteristics. The majority of funds in this group do not lower their exposures during recessions. 











However, when we study bull and bear regimes, all the funds in this group change their exposures 
against the market index, as the bear regimes are severer than recessions. One exception is the 
funds with lockup restrictions that do not suffer from redemptions. This seems to work for these 
funds as the excess returns are among the highest.  
Table 10 panel C shows the results for the non-directional strategies and the fundamental 
characteristics. There is no large difference in exposures among growth and recession periods for 
these HFs. This is because non-directional strategies, are not correlated with the market index. 
When we study bull and bear regimes, some groups decrease their exposures substantially. It 
appears that during bear regimes HFs are trying not only to minimise, but even to have negative 
exposures to the market index to protect themselves from the systematic risk. From the previous 
discussion we accept H3 that during stressful market conditions HFs, on average, decrease their 
market exposures, irrespective of the fundamental characteristics. 
 [Insert Table 10] 
4.4 Discussion of Results 
The relationship between size and performance is negative and this result is in agreement with 
the academic literature (Meredith, 2007; Joenväärä et al., 2012). Our results also agree with 
practitioners’ literature (Pertrac Corporation, 2012). However, our study shows that the 
relationship between size and performance is not static and changes with market conditions and 
HF strategies. Although this negative relationship holds for “good” times, during “bad” times it is 
statistically insignificant.  
The relationship between age and performance is negative as well, and this result is again in 
agreement with the literature (Meredith, 2007; Frumkin, and Vandegrif, 2009; Pertrac Corporation, 
2012). However, in this study we proceed further and stress test this relationship for “good” and 
“bad” market conditions and different HF strategies. We find that this holds for “good” times, but 
for “bad” times it is insignificant.  
The relationship between lockup restrictions and performance is positive and this result is 
again in agreement with the literature (Aragon, 2007; Joenväärä et al., 2012). However, we show 
that this relationship is not static as this negative relationship holds only during “good” times; 
during “bad” times, it is insignificant. This study facilitates investors in their decision process as 











times. We deal with the omitted variable bias (for specific commodity factors) and we stress-test 
previous studies. It is shown that the relationship between fund characteristics and fund 
performance is not static.  
Finally, we investigate HFs at mixed level (strategies and fund-specific characteristics at the 
same time). We find that directional strategies with specific characteristics (such as young and 
small funds) provide high returns to investors. On the other hand, non-directional strategies, 
especially those with no redemption restrictions, and young funds, suffer during “good” times. We 
also find that directional strategies (for example, strategies similar to traditional investments taking 
Long Only positions) with no redemption restrictions present significantly negative alpha. Young 
funds that follow less directional strategies also present significantly negative alpha due to lack of 
experience. The findings are important because investors can know what to expect from HFs at 
the mixed level during “bad” times, and might avoid paying high fees for significantly negative 
alpha during these “bad” times. 
 
4.5 Robustness Checks 
In this section, we examine the robustness of our main results. We first regress the HF returns 
only on the Wilshire 5000 TRI risk factor, conditional on the different regimes. The statistical 
significance of the proposed model is almost the same as the simple market model with only the 
Wilshire 5000 TRI risk factor. Hence, the analysis performed above is robust for the inclusion of 
other factors that may affect hedge index returns.  
During stressful market conditions, there is no significant alpha to HFs, on average, 
irrespective of fundamental fund factors. This is in agreement with the analysis at mixed level 
where during “good” times almost all funds deliver significant excess returns and during “bad” 
times the majority of funds do not deliver significant excess returns. 
We also estimate our model excluding the first 48 months (1/1990–12/1993) and implement 
the proposed specification again at the fundamental level. All the regressors have the same sign 
and are mostly statistically significant, making our findings robust. Moreover, we confirm the 
relative performance between funds with different characteristics. We also confirm that HFs 
deliver significant alpha only during “good” times, as opposed to “bad” times, where fund 










also estimate our model for the first 48 months (1/1990–12/1993) and the results are qualitatively 
comparable. The Newey-West estimator is used for any unknown residual autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity, and the results are still valid. Finally, we perform an out-of-sample test for our 
model at the fundamental level and also at the mixed level. Half of our data length is tested (in-
sample data) and the other half is reserved (out-of-sample) for business cycles and different market 
conditions separately, and our results still hold.11 
5 Conclusions 
We examine HF performance considering their fundamental characteristics under different 
business cycles and market conditions covering multiple financial crisis and credit events. We 
further analyse HF strategies at the mixed level, namely fundamental characteristics, at the same 
time. We also use the Markov switching model to identify the structural breaks conditional on the 
different states of the market. Finally, we use stepwise regressions to adjust to the different 
conditions. To study the impact of the fundamental on HF performance, we form portfolios based 
on HF characteristics: age, size and whether lockup periods exist or not. We further examine the 
impact of these fundamentals at strategy group level; to help investors in their asset and portfolio 
allocations, avoiding high fees for poor or even negative alphas. 
We deal with the omitted variable bias that existed in previous studies and we offer a number 
of interesting findings that contribute significantly to the HF literature. First, at the fundamental 
level, small and young funds, and funds with redemption restrictions, deliver higher alpha with 
respect to their peers, during ‘good’ only market conditions. During ‘bad’ times, the results related 
to previous studies should be further examined. More specifically, during “bad” times, small funds 
suffer more than large funds, young funds continue to outperform old funds, and funds that do not 
impose redemption restrictions (and survive) outperform funds with lockups, but these results are 
insignificant. 
Second, during “good” times HFs deliver significant excess returns, irrespective of the 
underlying fundamental characteristics. However, none of the underlying characteristics were able 
to significantly assist in delivering excess returns during ‘bad’ times. The results show that HFs 
                                                 











are more vulnerable than they are supposed to be during ‘bad’ times. Third, during stressful 
conditions, HFs decrease their market exposures, irrespective of their fundamental characteristics. 
Fourth, within specific fundamental characteristics that follow specific strategies, HFs deliver 
significant negative alpha to investors during ‘bad’ times. For instance, the Long Only strategy 
funds with no redemption restrictions, and the Multi Strategy for young funds, deliver significant 
negative alphas in “bad” times. On the other hand, the Others strategy for small and old funds 
provides extraordinary excess returns to investors during “bad” times. 
Our findings assist investors in having a better understanding of what to expect from HFs with 
different characteristics, considering business cycles and market conditions. They can have a guide 
and construct a portfolio according to their needs. We reveal that some HFs can even deliver 
negative alpha to investors (e.g. Long Only strategy funds with no redemption restrictions, and the 
Multi Strategy young funds, deliver significant negative alphas in ‘bad’ times). Investors are now 
aware that they may pay high fees for HFs that provide negative alpha. The controversial view that 
HFs always produce positive alpha to investors is challenged. Fund of fund managers can consider 
the different exposures of different funds with different characteristics and can build portfolios, 
which are balanced according to their needs. 
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Table 1  
Hedge Fund Factors 
Variable Descriptor 
MAI Market factor: Wilshire 5000 Total Return Monthly Index 
GEMI Global market factor: Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) world index 
Excluding US (Total Return Index) 
SMB Size factor: Small Minus Big 
 
HML High minus Low factor: High minus Low book-to-market capitalization 
MOM Momentum factor 
TERM Term spread premium: the spread between ten-year US government bonds and 3-month 
US treasury rate 
DEF Default premium: Differences in Promised Yields which is the spread between Moody’s 
corporate AAA and BAA bond yields 
COEN Energy factor: S&P GSCI Energy (Total Return Index) 
COPM  Precious metals factor: S&P GSCI Precious Metal (Total Return Index) 
COIM Industrial metals factor: S&P GSCI Industrial Metals (Total Return Index) 
COAG Agriculture factor: S&P GSCI Agriculture (Total Return Index) 
RLE Real estate factor: DJ US Select Real Estate Securities – Tot Return Index 
EXCH Currency factor: US Trade-Weighted Value of US Dollar against Major Currencies 
DVIX Option factor: CBOE S&P500 Volatility Index (VIX) (Price Index) 
Notes: This Table describes the factors used in this study. We classify them into six categories. Equity factors: MAI, 
GEMI, SMB, HML, and MOM. Credit factors: TERM, and DEF. Commodity factors: COEN, COPM, COIM, and 
COAG. Real estate factors: RLE. Currency factor: EXCH. Option factor: DVIX. The factors MAI, GEMI, COEN, 
COPM, COAG, and RLE are excess risk-free rates. The risk-free rate is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the 
























Table 2  
Hedge Fund Raw Returns Summary Statistics and Market Correlations 
Panel A        








Short Bias 0.05% 5.197 -0.924** Others 1.35% 1.091 0.232** 
Long Only 1.00% 3.437 0.707** Global 
Macro 
0.93% 2.017 0.223** 
Sector 1.15% 3.259 0.637** Relative 
Value 
0.82% 1.238 0.211** 
Long 
Short 
1.13% 2.663 0.550** Market 
Neutral 
0.53% 0.874 0.059** 
Event 
Driven 
0.94% 1.839 0.338** CTA 1.18% 3.415     0.048** 
Multi 
Strategy 
1.06% 1.713 0.271**     











Size Small 0.92% 2.069  Size 
Large 
1.02% 2.022  
Lockup-
Yes 
1.07% 2.269  Lockup-
No 
0.91% 1.884  
Age Young 0.77% 2.336  Age Old 0.99% 2.040  
Notes: Panel A reports summary statistics of monthly raw returns for each HF strategy and its correlation with the 
Wilshire 5000TRI, including dividends for the entire period under examination 01/1990-03/2014. We use the 
correlation of each strategy with the market index and we group the strategies as follows: a) directional (absolute 
values of the correlation coefficient above 0.5): Short Bias, Long Only, Sector and Long Short; b) semi-directional 
(absolute values of the correlation coefficient between 0.22 and 0.49): Event Driven, Multi Strategy, Others, and 
Global Macro; c) non-directional (absolute values of the correlation coefficient between 0 and 0.21): Relative Value, 
Market Neutral, and CTA. Each strategy is a representative-average time series of all the relevant HFs; ** denotes 
correlation significance at the 1% level. Panel B reports summary statistics of monthly raw returns for each of the six 
portfolios – size small, size large, age young, age old, lockup-yes, lockup-no (detailed descriptive statistics - raw and 












Table 3  
Alphas of HFs during growth, recessions, bull and bear regimes 




Young (Y) Old (O) Lockup Yes 
(Y) 
No Lockup (N) 
Panel A       
Growth –  
Constant 
1.219** 0.906** 1.709** 1.002** 1.322** 0.823** 










0.252 0.404 0.307 0.342 0.246 0.385 












Panel B       
Bull Regime - 
Constant 0.313** 0.476** 0.301** 0.428** 0.507** 0.372** 











Bear Regime - 
Constant 
0.211 0.073 0.359 0.082 0.037 0.097 











Panel C       
Growth - Adj. R-
square: 
0.742 0.790 0.639 0.821 0.773 0.807 
Recession - Adj. 
R-square: 
0.837 0.781 0.916 0.818 0.789 0.843 
Bull - Adj. R-
square: 
0.705 0.774 0.606 0.804 0.749 0.791 
Bear - Adj. R-
square: 
0.873 0.759 0.898 0.811 0.808 0.824 
Each Prob (F-
stat): 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This Table shows the Jensen’s alphas and exposures of the multi-factor model during growth/recession periods 
(Panel A), and bull/bear regimes (Panel B) at fundamental level (size, age, and lockup). HF returns are raw returns 
minus the risk free return. The Risk free (RF) return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French 
online data library (Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF returns. 
* and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% level respectively. The t-statistics are in parentheses. Z-values of the 
differences of the alpha coefficients among groups are presented. More specifically, the differences Small-Large, 
Young-Old and Yes-No. †,* and ** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively - (see, Paternoster et 






































Size Small 0.313** 1.219** 0.766 0.252 0.211 0.232 
Size Large 0.476** 0.906** 0.691 0.404 0.073 0.239 
Age Young 0.301** 1.709** 1.005 0.307 0.359 0.333 
Age Old 0.428** 1.002** 0.715 0.342 0.082 0.212 
Lockup-Yes 0.507** 1.322** 0.915 0.246 0.037 0.142 
Lockup-No 0.372** 0.823** 0.598 0.385 0.097 0.241 
Notes: This Table reports the excess returns for all groups (size, age, and lockup) between different 
states of the economy. The excess returns during “good” market conditions is the average of the excess 
returns during bull regimes and the excess returns during growth periods. The excess returns during 
“bad” market conditions is the average of the excess returns during bear regimes and the excess returns 
during recessions. ** denotes significance at 1% level. 
 
Table 5  
Alphas for directional, semi-directional and non-directional strategies 
 Directional Semi-Directional Non-Directional 












Size Small 0.656 0.090 0.638 0.842 0.357 0.578 
Size Large 1.081 0.368 0.735 0.531 0.262 0.708 
Age Young 1.236 0.163 0.524 0.242 0.204 0.788 
Age Old 0.711 0.027 0.773 0.464 0.411 0.383 
Lockup-
Yes 
0.746 0.403 0.718 0.671 0.776 0.450 
Lockup-No 0.628 -0.414 0.685 0.823 0.255 0.362 
Notes: This Table shows the average alphas for all groups (size, age, and lockup) belonging to the 
directional (absolute values of the correlation coefficient above 0.5), semi-directional (absolute values 
of the correlation coefficient between 0.22 and 0.49) and non-directional (absolute values of the 
correlation coefficient between 0 and 0.21) strategies during growth and recession periods as well as 
the bull and bear regimes. Overall for the mixed cases, during “good times” alphas are statistically 















Table 6  
Bottom/Top Performers 
“Good Conditions” “Bad” Conditions 
Sector – Young Funds 4.175** Others - Small Funds 4.142** 
Long Short -Young Funds 2.586** Others - Old Funds 2.462** 
Market Neutral – Young Funds -0.036 Long Only – Lockup-No Funds -3.524** 
Relative Value – Lockup-No Funds -0.225 Multi-Strategy – Young Funds -1.316* 
Notes: This Table shows the two top and bottom performers during “good” and ”bad” conditions. * and ** denote 
















Multi-Factor Model During Growth and Recession Periods 
Panel A - Dep. 
Variable 
Small Large Young Old Lockup No Lockup 
Market Index - MAI 0.376** 0.383** 0.393** 0.394** 0.430** 0.355** 
 (23.580) (27.686) (14.960) (29.873) (25.631) -29.015 
Small minus Big - 
SMB 
0.127** 0.154**  0.152** 0.173** 0.128** 
 (6.602) (9.093)  (9.461) (8.435) -8.581 
Momentum - MOM 0.063** 0.048** 0.103** 0.050** 0.047** 0.060** 
 (4.186) (3.868) (4.657) (4.269) (3.099) -5.483 
Commodity Energy - 
COEN 
0.026** 0.021** 0.029* 0.022** 0.022** 0.021** 
 (3.298) (3.134) (2.299) (3.424) (2.775) -3.662 
Default Spread - DEF -0.941** -0.491* -1.406** -0.652** -0.921** -0.515* 
 (-3.393) (-2.146) (-3.033) (-2.971) (-3.297) (-2.540) 
Commodity Previous 
Metals - COPM 
0.046**   0.032** 0.035*  
  (3.290)   (2.917) (2.469)  
High minus Low - 
HML 
 0.094** -0.081* 0.084** 0.082** 0.064** 
   (5.048) (-2.478) (4.745) (3.616) (3.886) 
Panel B - Dep. 
Variable 
Small Large Young Old Lockup No Lockup 
Market Index – MAI 0.228** 0.380** 0.294** 0.368** 0.277** 0.347** 
  (5.467) (8.936) (11.211) (9.913) (4.988) (10.886) 
Commodity Energy - 
COEN 
0.048**  0.044*    
  (3.514)  (2.757)    
Change in VIX - DVIX -0.027*    -0.034*  




Agriculture - COAG 
0.060* 0.086* 0.053* 0.091** 0.084* 0.081** 
  (2.060) (2.309) (2.500) (2.821) (2.297) (2.926) 
High minus Low - HML  -0.190* -0.253** -0.142*  -0.131* 
   (-2.544) (-6.352) (-2.180)  (-2.348) 


















Growth, F-statistic: 123.910 161.734 60.422 168.379 
 
125.836 179.299 
 Growth, Prob (F-stat): 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Recession, Adj. R-
square: 
0.837 0.781 0.916 0.818 0.789 0.843 
Recession, F-statistic: 43.203 40.253 69.276      50.505      42.190 59.907 
Recession, Prob (F-
stat): 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This Table shows exposures of the multi-factor model during growth (Panel A) and recession (Panel B) periods, 
at fundamental level (size, age, and lockup). HF returns are raw returns minus the risk free return. The Risk free (RF) 
return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online data library (Ibbotson Associates). MAI, 
GEMI, COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF returns. * and ** denotes significance at 5% and 1% 
level respectively. The t-statistics are in parentheses; panel C reports adjusted R-squared and F-statistics for growth 
















Multi-Factor Model during Bull and Bear Regimes 
Panel A-Dep. Var. Size Small Size Large Age Young Age Old Lockup-
Yes 
Lockup-No 
Market Index - MAI 0.410** 0.390** 0.403** 0.399** 0.422** 0.367** 
  (17.309) (26.012) (14.590) (28.150) (23.774) (27.542) 
Commodity Energy - 
COEN 
  
0.033** 0.027** 0.034** 0.028** 0.030** 0.026** 
(3.864) (3.929) (2.681) (4.195) (3.682) (4.285) 
Small minus Big - 
SMB 
  
0.133** 0.151**  0.149** 0.165** 0.127** 
(5.932) (8.094)  (8.424) (7.443) (7.684) 
Momentum - MOM 0.070** 0.052** 0.112** 0.052** 0.066** 0.053** 
  (4.640) (4.131) (5.356) (4.417) (4.499) (4.767) 
Commodity Precious 
Metals - COPM 
  
0.044**   0.032** 0.035*  
(3.081)   (2.880) (2.520)  
High minus Low -  
HML 
  
0.069** 0.100**  0.095** 0.095** 0.080** 
(2.624) (4.591)  (4.606) (3.684) (4.119) 
Change in VIX - 
DVIX 
0.010*      
  (2.033)      
Panel B-Dep. Var. Size Small Size Large Age Young Age Old Lockup-
Yes 
Lockup-No 
Market Index - MAI 0.237** 0.149* 0.223** 0.175** 0.196** 0.165** 
  (6.025) (2.467) (7.111) (3.369) (3.313) (3.718) 
Exchange Rate - 
EXCH 
-0.193*      
  (-2.553)      
High minus Low - 
HML 
-0.070*  -0.176**    
  (-2.268)  (-6.171)    
Commodity Energy - 
COEN 
0.043**      
  (3.754)      
Change in VIX – 
DVIX 
-0.021* -0.032*  -0.028* -0.034** -0.023* 
  (-2.421) (-2.517)  (-2.579) (-2.801) (-2.483) 
Small minus Big – 
SMB 
0.103* 0.193** 0.142** 0.159** 0.206** 0.140** 
  (2.378) (3.079) (3.226) (2.956) (3.347) (3.052) 
Commodity Industrial 
Metals – COIM 
 0.097** 0.113** 0.100** 0.086* 0.087** 
   (2.811) (4.466) (3.362) (2.521) (3.428) 
Panel C       













Bull, F-statistic:     87.702   174.727    84.061  174.787  127.063  193.394 
 
Bull, Prob (F-stat): 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Bear, adj. R-
square: 
0.873 0.759 0.898 0.811 0.808 0.824 




  38.602   37.866     41.951 
Bear, Prob (F-stat): 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes: This Table reports the exposures of the multi-factor model for the bull (Panel A) and bear (Panel B) regimes, 
at fundamental level (size, age, and lockup). HF returns are raw returns minus the risk free return. The Risk free (RF) 
return is the one-month Treasury bill rate from the Fama and French online library (Ibbotson Associates). MAI, GEMI, 
COEN, COPM, COIM, COAG and RLE are excess RF returns. * and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% level 
respectively. The t-statistics are in parentheses; panel C reports adjusted R-squared and F-statistics; empty cells mean 












Table 9  
MAI, SMB, HML, and MOM Analysis by Fundamental Group and State 
Market Index –MAI Growth 















MAI, Size Small (S) 0.376** 0.228** -39.40% 0.410** 0.237** -42.31% 
MAI, Size Large (L) 0.383** 0.380** -0.68% 0.390** 0.149** -61.85% 











SMB, Size Small (S) 0.127**   0.133** 0.103* -22.72% 
SMB, Size Large (L) 0.154**   0.151** 0.193** 27.80% 
SMB, Z-value of 
difference (S-L) 
-1.056   -0.611 -1.183  
HML Size Small (S)    0.069** -0.070* -201.01% 
HML, Size Large (L) 0.094** -0.190* -301.59% 0.100**   
HML, Z-value of 
difference (S-L) 
   -0.903   
MOM, Size Small (S) 0.063**   0.070**   
MOM, Size Large (L) 0.048**   0.052**   
MOM, Z-value of 
difference (S-L) 
0.478   0.927   
MAI, Age Young (Y) 0.393** 0.294** -25.09% 0.403** 0.223** -44.77% 
MAI, Age Old (O) 0.394** 0.368** -6.43% 0.399** 0.175** -56.24% 











SMB, Age Young (Y)     0.142**  
SMB, Age Old (O) 0.152**   0.149** 0.159** 6.99% 
SMB, Z-value of 
difference (Y-O) 
    -0.240  
HML, Age Young (Y) -0.081** -0.253** 211.95%  -0.176**  
HML, Age Old (O) 0.084** -0.142* -268.85% 0.095**   
HML, Z-value of 
difference (Y-O) 
-4.435** -1.458†     
MOM, Age Young (Y) 0.103**   0.112**   
MOM, Age Old (O) 0.050**   0.052**   
MOM, Z-value of 
difference (Y-O) 
2.096**   2.488**   
MAI, Lockup-Yes (Y) 0.430** 0.277** -35.44% 0.422** 0.196** -53.35% 
MAI, Lockup-No (N) 0.355** 0.347** -2.39% 0.367** 0.165** -55.06% 











SMB, Lockup-Yes (Y) 0.173**   0.165** 0.206** 24.92% 











SMB, Z-value of 
difference (Y-N) 
1.744*   1.356† 0.849  
HML, Lockup-Yes (Y) 0.082**   0.095**   
HML, Lockup-No (N) 0.064** -0.131* -304.36% 0.080**   
HML, Z-value of 
difference (Y-N) 
0.620   0.477   
MOM, Lockup-Yes (Y) 0.047**   0.066**   
MOM, Lockup-No (N) 0.060**   0.053**   
MOM, Z-value of 
difference (Y-N) 
-0.737   0.735   
Notes: This Table reports the market exposures of the proposed multi-factor model for all the groups 
(portfolios). Z-values of the differences of the MAI, SMB, HML, and MOM coefficients among groups, are 
presented. †,* and ** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively - (see, Paternoster et al., 












Table 10  
MAI Analysis by Fundamental, Strategy Group, and State 
MAI 
Exposures 
Growth Recession Difference 
(Base Growth) 
Difference 
 (% Base 
Growth) 
Bull Bear Difference 
(Base Bull) 
Difference 
(% Base Bull) 
 Panel A. Directional Strategies  
Size Small 0.276 0.234 0.042 15.28% 0.279 0.134 0.145 51.88% 
Size Large 0.238 0.172 0.066 27.69% 0.238 0.162 0.076 31.84% 
Age Young 0.278 0.084 0.194 69.73% 0.271 0.295 -0.024 8.87% 
Age Old 0.230 0.135 0.095 41.27% 0.223 0.110 0.113 50.74% 
Lockup-Yes 0.169 0.094 0.075 44.58% 0.150 0.162 -0.012 7.83% 
Lockup-No 0.252 0.144 0.108 42.90% 0.239 0.112 0.126 52.87% 
 Panel B. Semi-Directional Strategies  
Size Small 0.301 - - - 0.261 0.215 0.046 17.72% 
Size Large 0.226 0.220 0.007 2.94% 0.222 0.173 0.049 22.14% 
Age Young 0.223 0.274 -0.052 -23.15% 0.280 0.248 0.031 11.18% 
Age Old 0.241 0.301 -0.059 -24.75% 0.232 0.174 0.058 24.81% 
Lockup-Yes 0.446 - - - 0.333 0.514 -0.181 54.29% 
Lockup-No 0.219 0.411 -0.192 -88.04% 0.216 0.225 -0.009 3.97% 
 Panel C. Non-Directional Strategies  
Size Small 0.131 0.063 0.068 52.06% 0.193 -
0.026 
0.219 113.42% 
Size Large 0.096 - - - 0.101 - - - 
Age Young 0.139 0.174 -0.035 -24.91% 0.095 - - - 
Age Old 0.103 0.077 0.026 25.69% 0.101 -
0.157 
-0.258 -255.06% 
Lockup-Yes 0.115 0.316 -0.202 -175.52% 0.114 - - - 
Lockup-No 0.102 0.060 0.042 41.50% 0.082 -
0.208 
-0.290 -354.12% 
Notes: This Table presents the average exposures to the MAI market index for all groups (size, age, and lockups) 
that are directional-Panel A (absolute values of the correlation coefficient above 0.5), semi-directional-Panel B 
(absolute values of the correlation coefficient between 0.22 and 0.49) and non-directional strategies-Panel C 
(absolute values of the correlation coefficient between 0 and 0.21) during growth and recession periods as well as 
the bull and bear regimes. Since the growth periods and bull regimes are the longest, we use them as the base to 
measure the percentage difference of the exposure (MAI exposure for each mixed case is statistically significant 
from zero). The fourth (eighth) column gives the difference of the growth period (up regime) return minus the 
recession period (down regime) return. The fifth (ninth) column shows the percentage difference of the growth 
period (up regime) return minus the recession period (down regime) return. 
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